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I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACTS
A. Introduction
The main focus of this article is on rights to continuing
employment that have been or that may be legislated in Workers'
Compensation Acts. For such "rights" to be seen in context,
however, mention will also be made of the positions at common law
and under other statutes.
For many years, it has been suggested that a worker who has
sustained a compensable disability should have a statutory right to
continuing employment with the injury employer.' Legislation on
those lines has been enacted in Quebec,2 Ontario,3 and New
Brunswick.4 There are pressures for similar legislation in other
jurisdictions. This article, however, will focus on the general
principle rather than on the details of those statutes.
In any assessment of such a statutory right, it is crucial to
distinguish between:
(1) cases of temporary disability followed by a total recovery;
and
(2) cases involving some significant residual disability.
B. Temporary Disabilities
It is unlikely that a statutory right to continuing employment
has any broad significance when a worker has made a total recovery
from a temporary disability. Usually such a worker simply returns to
work. Both parties generally want to continue the employment
1 For example, Re the Future Employment of a Worker Disabled by a Compensable Injury
or Industrial Disease, Item No. 105, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Rep. 33 (B.C.).
2 Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases Act, S.Q. 1985, c. 6, ss 234-249.
3 Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, s.54b, as am. S.O. 1989, c. 47.
4 Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. W-13, ss 42.1 and 42.2, as am. N.B. Acts
1989, c. 65.
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relationship, and if the employer does not, it would usually be for a
reason that is unrelated to the compensable disability.
The position at common law is that in such situations, the
employment relationship continues. A temporary absence from work
because of a disability (whether compensable or not) may (depending
on the contract of employment) suspend an employer's obligation to
pay wages and other benefits; but it does not usually terminate or
otherwise suspend an employment relationship. Nor is it cause for
dismissal. Usually this is also the position under a collective
agreement.
Because statutory rights are often more noticeable than
common law rights, a statutory right to continuing employment can
be beneficial in some cases, especially if the statute includes a more
effective remedial structure than the common law. However, there
are several grounds for concern about the legislation that has been
passed so far.
(1) The drafting has been unfortunate. The terms "reinstate" (used
in Quebec) or "re-employ" (used in Ontario) imply that the
employment relationship has been terminated or suspended. That
misrepresents the legal position and is almost bound to cause
confusion.
(2) In at least one respect, and at least in the unorganized sector,
the legislation reduces rather than enhances the rights of a worker
who is returning to work from a compensable disability. It confers
upon the employer a right to assign the worker to different duties.
Depending on the terms of the employment contract, an employer
may not have that right at common law.
(3) The placing of a right to continuing employment in a workers'
compensation statute implies that a worker has no such right when
returning to work from a non-compensable disability. Thus, if a
right to continuing employment is to be enacted without reducing or
threatening the common law rights of injured workers, it should be
contained in employment standards legislation and applied to all
cases of temporary disability, regardless of eligibility for
compensation. The only distinction that it might be useful to make
is that where a disability is compensable, it may be desirable to
include a provision for additional enforcement by the compensation
board.
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C. Permanent Disabilities
More difficult situations occur where a worker has recovered
to the extent of being fit for some types of work, but there will be
some ongoing residual disability that precludes a return to the
worker's former duties. It is in these cases that most of the
problems arise. At common law, an employment relationship is not
terminated automatically by the occurrence of a permanent disability;
and this is also typically the case under collective agreements.
However, a permanent incapacity of a worker to perform the
essential duties of the occupation is cause for dismissal;5 and in some
cases, it is arguable that the employment relationship is terminated
by frustration.6 Also, of course, at common law an employer has the
right to terminate the employment by notice. This position is,
however, now modified in those jurisdictions where human rights
legislation requires an employer to avoid dismissal if continued
employment of the disabled worker can be achieved by reasonable
accommodation.
In the organized sector, a worker with a permanent disability
who would be able to return to work with some change of duties
may have a right to continuing employment under the terms of a
collective agreement.7 For the reasons explained below, however, it
is counter-productive to confer such a right in a Workers'
Compensation Act.
5 For more precise definition of the employer's right to dismiss in the organized sector,
see, for example, Re Domglas Inc. and Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers (1988), 33 L.A.C.
(3d) 88; Pacific Western Airlines and Flight Attendants Assoc. (1987), 28 L.A.C. (3d) 291.
6 For a discussion of termination by frustration, see, for example, Marshall v. Harland &
Wolff, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 899.
7 Where a worker is unable to carry out the duties that were performed by that worker
prior to injury, the employer may be under some obligation to offer alternative employment
even where there is no express clause to that effect in the collective agreement. See, for
example, MT&T and Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, (1984) 16 L.A.C. (3d) 318. This
would seem to follow logically from the terms of any collective agreement where the
management's rights clause includes a right to assign the worker to other types of work and
there is other work available within the residual capacity of the worker.
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1. The fragility of the "right"
It is unrealistic to expect that any "right" to continuing
employment will be legislated for the lifetime of a disabled worker.
In practice, there are fairly short time limits, one year in some cases
and two years in others. Bearing in mind that the statutory "right"
will only be relevant where the employer would not otherwise want
to continue the employment of the disabled worker, it is difficult to
see much benefit in a worker with a pernanent disability having a
right to continuing employment that expires in a relatively short
time. The obvious risk is that, at the expiration of this period, the
employment will be terminated.8 This occurrence is all the more
likely if the influence of experience rating has already created an
adversarial tone in the relationship between the employer and the
worker.9 Moreover, since reasons other than the disability are likely
to be given for the termination, it may be very difficult at that stage
for the worker to re-establish any right to compensation benefits or
to rehabilitation services.
Enforcement of the employer's obligation is also fraught with
potential difficulties. Enforcing the employment of a disabled
worker is different from most reinstatements following a labour
arbitration because the reason the employer wants the disabled
worker out of the employment is ongoing. Apart from the risk of
dismissal or termination by notice, an employer might be tempted to
create sufficient irritations that the worker is persuaded to quit.
The eligibility of the worker for further compensation benefits and
rehabilitation assistance would then depend upon enquiries and
moral value judgments about the behaviour over time of the worker
and the employer. Adjudication on issues of that type is extremely
difficult.
This problem, coupled with the brevity of the "right," is likely
to undermine the incentive to enforcement to such an extent that in
practice, the "right" is unenforceable against the countervailing
8 There is anecdotal evidence of this happening in Quebec, but I am not aware of any
survey work from which any quantitive estimate could be produced.
9 See T.G. Ison, '"he Significance of Experience Rating" (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall L.J.
1990]
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pressures. In the meantime, the exercise of the "right," or any
refusal of the worker to exercise it, are grounds for the termination
of compensation benefits. Moreover, the existence of the "right" to
continuing employment may have diverted the worker, a
rehabilitation counsellor and others from considering whether
retraining or other skill developments may have placed the worker
in a better position in the open labour market. For these reasons,
the risk that the continuing employment may not last for very long
is serious.
Again, an employer who offers alternative employment only in
response to legal pressure may be unwilling to consider in any
thoughtful or sensitive way the suitability of the alternative
employment in relation to the residual disability of the worker.
Acceptance by the worker of any offer of unsuitable employment
may create a risk of further disablement, and to decline such an
offer may create a risk of controversy.
One aspect of the problem is that legislation of this type
requires the use of difficult and unrealistic classifications. For
example, the Ontario legislation1 ° requires the Board to determine
whether the worker is:
(a) "medically able to perform the essential duties of the
worker's pre-injury employment"
(b) "medically able to perform suitable work" or (presumably)
(c) neither of the above.
The use of such classifications can be very difficult, particularly for
disabilities (such as bad backs) that can vary from month to month
in their impact upon the capacity of the worker.
The use of such classifications also tends to create expectations
of certain levels of performance. For this reason, the use of such
classifications can be threatening to the worker and thereby
undermine the confidence that is needed for rehabilitation. The use
of such classifications also militates against allowing a worker to
discover his own working capacity by a graduated return to work.
Such classifications are also fraught with adjudicative difficulties.
One problem is that those who are most familiar with the medical
condition of the worker are least likely to be familiar with the
10 See supra, note 3.
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demands of alternative jobs in the work environment. Similarly,
those who are most familiar with the demands of alternative jobs in
that environment are likely to be unfamiliar with the details of the
worker's medical condition and its occupational significance. This
problem is not solved by making the decision the responsibility of a
board that has first-hand knowledge of neither and only second-hand
knowledge of each. It is largely for this reason that the
determination of "suitable employment" in workers' compensation
systems has always been a cause of injustice, contention, complaint
and waste. It is also largely for this reason that, for cases of
permanent disability, the need to determine "suitable employment"
has been abolished in the past in favour of pensions calculated by
reference to the degree of impairment.
Even where a worker wants to continue the employment and
an unwilling employer strives to fulfil the statutory obligation in
good faith, it still does not follow that all will be well. The worker
could be laid-off subsequently along with others for redundancy,
perhaps because of a plant closure, possibly due to changing
technology or to changing political or market conditions. The
disability may then have a negative impact when the worker seeks
employment on the open labour market. If the worker then applies
for a renewal of compensation benefits and rehabilitation assistance,
there is an obvious risk of controversy about whether the current
unemployment of the worker is due to the economic lay-off or to
the compensable disablement.
Further problems of adjudication are likely to arise when issues
of continuing employment are taken to an external appeal tribunal.
The delays that occur in such appellate processes are likely to make
the right of appeal in these cases almost useless. Also issues relating
to continuing employment are likely to be inseparable from issues
relating to entitlement to compensation. Yet the appeal tribunal
may find that, because of the way in which matters have been
handled at the board, it has jurisdiction to deal only with one of
those issues and not the other.
1990]
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2. Impact on compensation
There is no prospect of a statutory "right" to continuing
employment existing concurrently with a realistic right to
compensation. For most of the history of workers' compensation
in Canada, it has been traditional that in serious cases of permanent
disability, the compensation has consisted of a pension payable for
life and measured by reference to the degree of impairment. In
Quebec and Ontario, such pensions were abolished as part of a
trade-off that involved a reversion to some variation of the actual
loss of earnings method of calculating compensation benefits,
together with the statutory "right" to continuing employment. In
New Brunswick, such pensions had already been abolished when the
statutory "right" was enacted. In all of these provinces, the result is
that a relatively well-defined right to monetary compensation is
replaced by a more nebulous and illusory "right" to continuing
employment, coupled with the possibility of future compensation
benefits assessed on a much more discretionary or judgmental basis.
If the pensions were being assessed under the former system by an
inappropriate formula, a more just solution could have been found
in a new formula for their calculation.
Moreover, where the enactment of a statutory "right" to
continuing employment is part of a trade-off for a reduction in
compensation rights, there are large categories of workers who will
only be affected by the downside of the trade-off. These categories
include construction workers, temporary employees, those employed
in the unorganized sector, and the self-employed. Such workers are
typically excluded from the statutory "right," but even to the extent
that any of them may be covered, the "right" is likely to be of little
value. Similarly, a provincial "right" to continuing employment will
not apply to workers engaged in federally-regulated industries; but
the reduction in compensation rights does apply to those workers.
3. Impact on rehabilitation at places of employment
Another negative impact of the "right" is the extent to which it
generates a regime of social control over injured workers. An array
of para-professional "rehabilitation" companies has sprung into
[voL- 28 NO. 4
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existence, offering their services to employers to reduce
compensation costs by the rehabilitation of disabled workers.
Compensation claims and claimants are "managed" by "professionals"
to achieve "rehabilitation." Some larger employers have internal staff
performing similar functions. Thus, in addition to the difficulties
mentioned above, disabled workers may be subjected to a regime of
"management" by para-professional personnel, not selected by
themselves, but by an employer who may, at least to some extent, be
adverse in interest. While the result in many cases may be the
provision of a needed service for a disabled worker, this structure is
still one that is offensive to traditional notions of civil liberties and
professional ethics, as well as being a likely cause of anxiety, other
forms of therapeutic harm, and injustice.
It is axiomatic that the extent to which workers, collectively
and individually, are able to control their own work environments is
a very significant variable in relation to health.'1 Individual control
is even more important for a worker who has sustained a permanent
disability or who has other health problems. That control is
facilitated by a regime under which permanent disabilities are
compensated by a pension and rehabilitation is voluntary. That
control is minimized by a regime under which permanent disabilities
are compensated (if at all) by the actual loss of earnings method,
and "rehabilitation" is, in effect, compulsory. For this reason, the
new regimes of social control are likely to have a negative effect on
the future health of disabled workers.
These problems with the statutory "right" are not confined to
cases which would have involved difficulties with rehabilitation in
any event. They can apply also to cases in which rehabilitation
would otherwise have gone smoothly. A related concern is that, at
least in Ontario, the Board now sends a routine notice informing an
injury employer of the worker's "right" and of the employer's
obligations in relation to continuing employment. This is done
without knowing whether there would otherwise be a problem in
the particular case. It may, therefore, create problems which would
not otherwise exist. At least, it can tend to create an unfortunate
11For example, see R. Labonte, "Point of View 1: Towards a New Occupational Health
Science" (1990) 12:5 At The Centre at 15.
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image of the disabled worker as a burden that the employer has to
bear.
4. Impact on board rehabilitation programs
A statutory "right" to continuing employment creates a notion
of rehabilitation that is incompatible with the provision of a sound
rehabilitation service. A problem of rehabilitation in the past has
been that a return to the former employment has been too
automatic. Indeed, many of the boards have commonly prescribed
the return of a worker to the former employment as a primary goal
of rehabilitation. Of course, it is a desirable goal in most cases,
though they are not usually the cases for which rehabilitation
services are most needed. The problem is that what is usually a
good thing tends to become a universal prescription for all cases.
Thus, a statutory right to return to the former employment seems to
make such a return even more automatic. If the injury employer
has an obligation to continue the employment of a disabled worker,
it seems to follow almost automatically that this is perceived at the
board as what ought to happen.
There are two difficulties with this. First, there is a pervasive
tendency for rehabilitation to be seen as a process of recovery from
a past injury. It is usually seen as the post-acute phase of recovery.
It is less often seen as a process for avoiding the next injury.
Preventive rehabilitation has received attention in recent years,
but its development has been set back very seriously by the
enactment of a statutory "right" to return to the former employment.
A necessary ingredient of any good rehabilitation program, and
something which has been done by some boards some of the time,
is the preventive screening of disabled workers, particularly those
who have suffered repeated back injuries. The purpose of this
screening should be, and sometimes has been, to identify those who
should be advised not to return to their former employment, and
who should be offered other forms of rehabilitation. When a
statutory structure is created that tends to make a return to the
former employment automatic, such programs of preventive
rehabilitation may be lost in the shuffle, with the result that people
may remain in damaging occupations even after the damaging impact
[VOL. 28 No. 4
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has become apparent. A predictable result is that workers in this
situation may sustain a further disablement when they are too old
for retraining and yet still too young to retire.
Where an injury employer has a statutory obligation to find a
job for a disabled worker, it is unrealistic to expect that a
compensation board will consider whether retraining or other
services may be necessary for alternative employment. The practical
result may well be to return workers to jobs that are medically
unsound for them, or that are economically unsound in the long run.
The second difficulty with any program of returning disabled
workers automatically to their former employment is that it strips
them of the basic human right to change one's occupation or
lifestyle. A sound rehabilitation service is not one that has any
stereotyped approach, or any stereotyped perception of what
constitutes a successful rehabilitation. A sound rehabilitation service
will be one that strives to understand and to meet the needs of each
worker, and that helps each worker to achieve his or her own goals
and aspirations. Obviously there is scope for debate about how far
a compensation board should go in this respect in any particular
case, but a sound rehabilitation service must be one that begins by
trying to understand the needs and aspirations of each candidate for
rehabilitation. In many cases, these needs will be met by a return
to the former occupation; but in some other cases, the need may be
for a change in occupation, a change in place of residence, a switch
to a domestic life, early retirement, relocation in a foreign country,
et cetera.
A statutory "right" to continue the former employment does not
preclude a compensation board from offering assistance with other
forms of rehabilitation, but it makes it less likely that other forms of
rehabilitation will be offered. Indeed, the mere existence of the
statutory "right" to continuing employment makes it less likely that
a disabled worker will even come to the attention of a rehabilitation
consultant.
Related to this, ordinary bureaucratic and budgeting pressures
within a compensation board are likely to militate against
rehabilitation planning. If a worker has a "right" to continue the
former employment, and if a rehabilitation consultant has a heavy
case load, returning the worker to the former employment may be
the easiest thing to do. It may then be done without any assessment
1990] 849
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of any risks to the future health of the worker, and without serious
discussion of any preference that the worker may have for some
other form of rehabilitation.
In the result, a nominal statutory "right" to return to the injury
employment means that in practice, the worker will lose the right
not to go back. While the statutory language purports to confer a
right upon the worker and an obligation upon the employer, the
reality is likely to be the other way around. The statutory "right"
becomes a euphemism for a form of directed labour. It is an
invasion of basic civil liberties. Under this regime, rehabilitation is
not a service that is offered to disabled workers but a euphemism
for controlling and curtailing their choices about what they want to
do.
Even the constitutional right of a Canadian citizen to leave the
jurisdiction is impaired by this statutory right to continuing
employment. A worker who elects to leave the jurisdiction may be
"deemed" to be earning what could have been earned by the exercise
of the statutory "right," and therefore be disqualified from future
compensation benefits for loss of earnings.
Moreover, when the statutory "right" to continuing employment
is coupled with the abolition of pensions and a reversion to the
actual loss of earnings method of calculating benefits for permanent
disability, "rehabilitation" is almost bound to become a euphemism
for benefit control, both at places of employment and at the
compensation boards. This, in turn, is a negative influence on the
calibre of people who can be attracted to serve as rehabilitation
consultants. For this reason too, the statutory "right" is incompatible
with the provision of a genuine rehabilitation service.
For all of these reasons, a statutory "right" of a worker with a
permanent disability to continuing employment with the injury
employer is not in the interests of workers. It is incompatible with
the healthier notions of rehabilitation. Nor is it in the interests of
employers, except as a device for reducing the apparent cost of
compensation benefits.
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II. OTHER STATUTES
A. Occupational Health and Safety Legislation
In several jurisdictions, occupational health and safety legislation
recognizes the right of a worker to decline the performance of work
that may be injurious to himself or to another worker. When a
worker does so decline, the employer has, at least in some
circumstances, an obligation to assign the worker to other duties.
12
While this legislation is aimed primarily at prevention, it may also
serve a purpose in remedial rehabilitation. In some cases, the
hazardous nature of the worker's duties may result from the
combined impact of the work or the work environment and an
existing (perhaps recent) disability.
For the cases to which they apply, rights under occupational
health and safety legislation can have several advantages over the
ostensible "right" under Workers' Compensation Acts. One is that
when the right is being asserted under an occupational health and
safety statute, the attention of all concern is more likely to focus on
finding a job and a work environment that will not be injurious to
the worker. Secondly, such rights are more independent of the
compensation system and therefore less likely to produce legislative
changes for the reduction of compensation benefits.
B. Human Rights and Employment Equity Legislation
Human rights statutes have been amended to include
disablement among the prohibited grounds of discrimination, and a
substantial proportion of the complaints to human rights commissions
now relate to alleged discrimination in employment because of a
disability 3  However, human rights legislation only creates an
12 If an employer dismisses such a worker instead of following the statutory procedure,
an action may lie for damages for wrongful dismissal. See, for example, Crossman v. Scotia
Textiles (1989), [1990] 27 C.C.E.L. 302.
13 See annual reports of the federal and provincial human rights commissions in Canada.
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obligation not to discriminate against the disabled; it does not
generally create any obligation to employ them.
Within the context of human rights legislation, there are
basically two ways in which a positive obligation to employ the
disabled might come about. First, it might be alleged, particularly in
relation to a large enterprise with a high proportion of light jobs,
that the failure to employ disabled people is so extensive and
systematic that the statistics alone are evidence of discrimination.
The remedy sought may be an affirmative action program. Secondly,
obligations to employ the disabled might be created under newer
types of employment equity legislation.
14
A development on these lines would have some advantages.
First, because such legislation covers sex and racial equality, as well
as the disabled, the community of disabled people would have allies
in promoting its success on the political scene. Secondly, because
such programs are part of a broader policy of promoting human
equality, there might be less risk that they would become an excuse
for reducing or refusing to implement any program of income
insurance, or any other form of income security relating to
disablement. Thirdly, "employment equity" is a term that might be
seen to embody an inspirational theme that is a part of the political
hype of the age. Enforcement by socio-political pressures and the
media might therefore be feasible, and the weaknesses of the legal
techniques available for enforcement may be less significant.
There are, however, some downside risks with affirmative action
programs. One relates to the lack of even-handed enforcement of
a predetermined general obligation. If certain places of employment
are targeted for affirmative action programmes before others, there
may be complaints from the employers concerned that the
enforcement is arbitrarily selective, and therefore inequitable.
There are also well-known problems with the nature and
structure of human rights commissions. They generally proceed at
a ponderously slow pace, and they do not generally have the
expertise or the budget to cope in a responsive way with ergonomic
arguments.
14 For a good discussion of this, see D. Baker, Anticipating the Next Generation of
Equaliy Issues in Employment for Disabled People in Canada (Toronto: Advocacy Resource
Centre for the Handicapped, 1989).
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A primary concern is that because "employment equity" is a
catch-phrase that is part of the political hype of the age and because
political opposition to the notion is very powerful, legislative changes
might be made impulsively and without any adequate study. Legal
and administrative structures may then be created that do not
produce any output comparable to the input. The introduction of
such legislative changes without adequate study is also likely to
produce unforeseen and possibly damaging side effects, perhaps for
disabled people, and perhaps for other sections of the population.
C. Quota Systems
Another type of statutory provision for the employment of
disabled people is one that would place upon employers an
obligation to engage the disabled so that they constitute a specified
percentage of each workforce. This idea has been used in Britain,
Europe and Japan, and it is commonly known as a "quota" system.
While each employer above a specified size has an obligation to
employ a percentage of disabled people, this system has the
advantage that the employer is under no obligation to employ any
particular person; nor is any worker under any pressure to work for
any particular employer. To this extent, the employment relationship
in respect of any particular worker remains voluntary, both for the
employer and the employee.
There is another respect, too, in which this system is better
than a statutory "right" to continuing employment under the Workers'
Compensation Acts. Many of the serious disabilities that result from
employment occur in the high hazard industries, such as mining,
forestry, fishing, construction, and transport. These are also the
heavy industries in which the opportunities for rehabilitation are
limited. These are, therefore, also the industries in which a right to
available and "suitable" employment with the injury employer is least
likely to be of any use. Under a quota system, the obligation to
employ the disabled is more evenly spread, thus creating greater
obligations to employ the disabled in light industry, in office
occupations, and in the service industries where the obligation is
more likely to be realistic.
1990]
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There are, however, serious concerns about quota systems.
First, there is the problem of definition and identification.
Candidates for employment do not divide neatly and obviously
between those who are disabled and those who are not. If the
definition used in the scheme is a fairly narrow one, it might exclude
the bad back cases, and if it does, it would probably exclude most of
the problem cases in rehabilitation. On the other hand, if the bad
back cases are included, there would be an obvious difficulty in
defining any workable perimeter to the category of people covered
by the scheme. This problem can be mitigated by a registration
system so that the classification of a person as disabled becomes
largely a matter of self-selection; but the problem would still remain
to some extent.
In this connection, I recall an interview some years ago with
the company doctor at a major industrial plant in England. I asked
what they would do if they discovered that the proportion of
registered disabled people employed at the plant had fallen below
the quota. His reply was to the effect that "That's no problem. We
just go round the plant and ask a few more of our workers to
register as disabled."
Second, there may be problems of stigma and of image
associated with such a scheme, particularly in cases of mental illness.
For example, in Britain, it has been said that a majority of disabled
people did not register themselves as disabled because of the stigma
that this would imply. If they wanted to be employed, it was in the
open labour market, rather than through a mechanism which would
imply that they were less desirable employees.
A more subtle form of stigma can attach to those who are not
readily employable at all, perhaps because of a combination of
disability and natural aging. A quota system might create the
impression that all disabled people are potentially employable, and
that, therefore, a disabled person who remains unemployed must
have made a choice in favour of idleness.
Third, there are the problems of enforcement. Even if
enforcement was unnecessary to achieve rehabilitation goals, it would
still be important to achieve equity among employers. The State
surely has a moral duty to ensure that the most law-abiding
employers do not suffer a competitive disadvantage because of their
compliance with the law. One problem with enforcement is again
[VCOL. 28 No. 4
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the difficulty of definition and identification. Another is that the
incidence of political power would normally militate against any
thorough and effective program of enforcement. Partly for this
reason, any kind of quota system might be more effective if it is
supported by financial incentives and tax penalties rather than by
any attempt to use criminal law.
Fourth, if the scheme creates a perception that all disabled
people have employment opportunities, the result could be to
undermine existing or potential systems for income support. Since
rights to money payments are generally more readily defined and
more readily enforceable than rights to employment, disabled people
might lose realistic rights only to gain rights that are less viable.
Related to this, such a scheme may reflect an unnecessary
enlargement of the work ethic. Given the technological changes of
recent years and the continuing levels of unemployment, there is no
societal need for all disabled people to be in the work-force.
It is commonly said that disabled people want to work. Many
and probably most of them do; but what people want to do is partly
conditioned by what they see as their alternatives. If we had
adequate insurance coverage that provided good pensions for
disabled people without any means test,i1 employment would become
more realistically an option rather than a compelling imperative.
Moreover, a good pension system is the best way to ensure that
disabled people can find satisfying types of work. If they want
employment for reasons of self-fulfilment, or to augment their
standards of living, they are more likely to find satisfying jobs than
if they must work to provide for their basic income needs.
Finally, it 'is difficult to assess whether the achievement of a
quota system would be enough to justify the opportunity cost.
Placing obligations upon employers is never cost-free. The more
burdens that are placed upon employers in the regulation of
employment, the more difficult it becomes to comply with the total
package. Additional obligations can also increase the incentive to
find ways of doing business that do not involve an employment
relationship. For these reasons, it is important to be sure that the
15 See T.G. Ison, "Human Disability and Personal Income" in L. Kiar, ed., Studie' in
Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) 425.
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achievement is going to be worth it before creating any new
obligation.
These arguments are presented not as reasons for rejecting any
proposal for a quota system, but as reasons for caution. The idea
of a quota system could benefit from a more detailed study in the
Canadian context.
D. Facilitative Legislation
Apart from any obligation to hire the disabled, there are other
statutory duties that could be placed upon employers, or upon
certain types of employers, to facilitate their employment; particularly
legislation relating to the design of the work environment. Such
requirements can be very beneficial with little downside risk. Of
course, some disabilities can only be accommodated by work station
adjustments that are specific for an individual; but there are many
types of disabilities (including paraplegia, blindness, deafness, and
bad backs) for which the employinent of significant numbers can be
assisted by ergonomic requirements of a more general nature.
The proportion of the total work force that is employed in
office occupations and in the service industries is constantly
increasing. Moreover, it is in these occupations that the employment
of a disabled person is least likely to be adversely affected by aging.
Thus, the development of employment opportunities in office jobs
and in the service industries could be the most beneficial as well as
the easiest achievement, though admittedly, such jobs will not be
suitable for a proportion of disabled people. Yet we still do not
have adequate requirements for even new places of employment to
be accessible to the disabled. Similarly, in spite of all that is known
about office furniture and environments, we still do not have basic
ergonomic requirements, such as a prescription that all new office
desks must be of an adjustable height. Legislated ergonomic
requirements of this type are desirable not only to facilitate the
employment of those with permanent disabilities, but also for the
prevention of disablement, and for the rehabilitation of those who
are temporarily disabled. Some ergonomic requirements, such as
desks of adjustable height, could also facilitate the achievement of
sex and racial equality.
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Rights to Employment
Perhaps more might be achieved by regulating the design of
places of employment than by the regulation of hiring. If, in the
establishment of any new place of employment, an employer is
required to make the work environment accessible to and suitable
for the disabled, the recruitment of disabled people may then seem
more natural. At least some of the traditional arguments for not
hiring the disabled (such as the washroom argument) would then
disappear.
IlI. CONCLUSION
A "right" to continuing employment enacted in a workers'
compensation statute for cases of permanent disability is counter-
productive, illusory, and damaging at least to the interests of disabled
workers. If there is to be any statutory obligation upon employers
to hire the disabled, a quota system is probably the most viable. At
least the idea could benefit from further study in the Canadian
context.
In support of statutory rights to employment, it is commonly
said that the opportunity to work is a basic human need, one that
is a part of human nature. It is also a part of the conventional
rhetoric of "rehabilitation professionals" that work is necessary to
maintain human dignity and a sense of self-worth. Yet one has only
to visit a fashionable recreational club in one of our major cities to
discover that there are numbers of people leading a life of leisure
with apparent dignity and certainly with a high sense of self-worth.
Disabled people commonly proclaim their desire to work, but this is
not the result of any natural human need. It reflects a desire of
particular people for jobs in which they find, or would find, self-
fulfilment; it reflects the need for income and the lack of alternative
sources of income; and it reflects also the political cultivation of the
work ethic. The political posture of disabled people's organizations
may sometimes also reflect an element of modesty and self-denial;
a reluctance to press any demand for what might seem like unearned
income.
A legislative development that is clearly desirable, with a
minimum of downside risk, is facilitative legislation to promote the
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employment of the disabled, particularly ergonomic regulation, at
least in relation to new places of employment and new equipment.
Lastly, the development that would be the most clearly
beneficial for disabled people is a comprehensive social insurance
system that would provide regular pension income for those with
permanent disabilities.16 Incidentally, and perhaps paradoxically, such
legislation is more likely to result in disabled people finding self-
fulfilment in jobs that are congenial to them than any legislation that
purports to create rights to work.
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